Evaluating Constitutional Hardball: Two Fallacies and a Research Agenda by Fishkin, Joseph & Pozen, David E.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2019 
Evaluating Constitutional Hardball: Two Fallacies and a Research 
Agenda 
Joseph Fishkin 
University of Texas at Austin School of Law, jfishkin@law.utexas.edu 
David E. Pozen 
Columbia Law School, dpozen@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the Public Law and Legal 
Theory Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Evaluating Constitutional Hardball: Two Fallacies and a Research 
Agenda, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE, VOL. 119, P. 158, 2019; COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 
14-621 (2019). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2450 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact cls2184@columbia.edu. 
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE 
VOL. 119 MAY 20, 2019 PAGES 158–72 
 158
EVALUATING CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL: TWO 
FALLACIES AND A RESEARCH AGENDA 
Joseph Fishkin * & David E. Pozen ** 
This Reply addresses the responses by Professors David Bernstein 
and Jed Shugerman to our essay Asymmetric Constitutional 
Hardball. Bernstein’s response, we argue, commits the common fallacy 
of equating reciprocity with symmetry: assuming that because 
constitutional hardball often “takes two” to play, both sides must be 
playing it in a similar manner. Shugerman’s response, on the other 
hand, helps combat the common fallacy of equating aggressiveness with 
wrongfulness: assuming that because all acts of constitutional hardball 
strain norms of governance, all are similarly damaging to democracy. 
We suggest that whereas Bernstein’s approach would set back the 
burgeoning effort to study constitutional hardball, Shugerman’s 
distinction between hardball and “beanball” provides a useful starting 
point for theorizing the conditions under which constitutional hardball 
may be more or less justified as a matter of political and constitutional 
morality. 
INTRODUCTION 
In our essay Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, we argue that from 
the mid-1990s to the present, both Republican and Democratic officials 
have engaged in significant amounts of constitutional hardball, often in 
response to each other, but that this practice has not been symmetric. 
Republicans have engaged in more frequent and intense constitutional 
hardball than Democrats. Our essay offers a multilevel explanation for 
this asymmetry, which we think is crucial for understanding the past 
quarter century of American politics.1 
From the moment we began this project, we knew it would entail 
serious methodological challenges. There are many kinds of constitutional 
hardball and few straightforward ways to quantify most of them. Assessing 
particular cases is not only inherently complex but also deeply entangled 
with the sometimes-vehement claims of partisans and participants them-
selves about how different episodes ought to be characterized—claims 
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that are endemic to the practice of constitutional hardball. Nevertheless, 
we concluded that the evidence of asymmetric constitutional hardball is 
sufficiently robust, and the stakes of understanding its causes and effects 
sufficiently high, that we ought to move ahead with our analysis. 
We are thankful to Professors David Bernstein and Jed Shugerman 
for thoughtful and detailed responses to our essay. They come at the 
subject from opposite directions. Bernstein contests our claim that there 
is a current asymmetry in the practice of constitutional hardball. He 
argues that when one considers certain examples of Democratic constitu-
tional hardball that we did not discuss, and in addition when one reallocates 
more of the responsibility for various government shutdowns to Democrats, 
the appearance of partisan imbalance disappears.2 Shugerman argues the 
reverse. According to Shugerman, our essay substantially understates the 
degree of asymmetry, both by omitting certain examples of Republican 
constitutional hardball and by failing to emphasize the distinctiveness 
and severity of some of the examples we do discuss.3 
The responses differ, as well, in their methodological approaches. 
Bernstein is intensely skeptical of the proposition that it is ever possible 
to determine whether one side is playing more aggressive constitutional 
hardball, at least in situations where both sides are playing to some extent.4 
He is particularly skeptical that it is ever possible to apportion greater 
responsibility for a government shutdown to one side over another, given 
that shutdowns necessarily involve the failure of two sides to reach an 
agreement.5 
Shugerman, on the other hand, agrees with our basic asymmetry 
thesis but insists that some instances of constitutional hardball are so 
much more egregious than others as to require an additional conceptual 
category.6 He calls this category “beanball.” Roughly, beanball consists of 
political actors breaching norms of constitutional politics in an especially 
antidemocratic fashion, attempting, as it were, to knock their opponents 
                                                                                                                           
 2. David E. Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball Yes, Asymmetric Not So Much, 118 
Colum. L. Rev. Online 207 (2018) [hereinafter Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball], http:// 
columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Bernstein-CONSTITUTIONAL_ 
HARDBALL_YES_ASYMMETRIC_NOT_SO_MUCH.pdf [http://perma.cc/SSA8-XZXM]. 
 3. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Hardball vs. Beanball: Identifying Fundamentally 
Antidemocratic Tactics, 119 Colum. L. Rev. Online 85 (2019), http://columbialawreview.org/ 
content/hardball-vs-beanball-identifying-fundamentally-antidemocratic-tactics/ [http://perma. 
cc/PU76-PVMF]. The basic disagreement between Bernstein and Shugerman bears out a 
prediction made in the conclusion of Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball : “We expect that 
some right-leaning readers may remain skeptical of the asymmetry thesis, while some left-
leaning readers may feel we have enacted something analogous to the very Democratic 
tendencies we discuss, by being overly anxious to identify caveats and complications.” 
Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 976. 
 4. See Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 208–11. 
 5. See id. at 210–11. 
 6. See Shugerman, supra note 3, at 87–89. 
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out of the game.7 Whereas Bernstein would seemingly lump all hardball 
acts and actors together—not only denying the existence of any meaningful 
partisan discrepancy but also abandoning the entire endeavor of investi-
gating patterns of distribution or questions of responsibility—Shugerman 
would split the field further—not only distinguishing constitutional 
hardball from ordinary politics but also distinguishing ordinary hardball 
from extraordinary beanball. 
The contrast between these two responses is illuminating. We believe 
that much of Bernstein’s analysis is based on a fundamentally flawed 
premise: that whenever it can be shown that constitutional hardball is 
reciprocal, in the sense that both sides are playing, it follows that such 
hardball is also symmetrical, in the sense that both sides are playing in a 
similar manner. We can understand the appeal of this premise. It seems 
to offer an escape from the difficulty of evaluating which political 
maneuvers place more or less strain on existing norms of governance 
and which political actors bear more or less responsibility for such strain. 
Unfortunately, however, that escape route is a mirage. The student of 
constitutional hardball cannot avoid making these kinds of contestable 
judgments—and indeed, they are at the heart of Bernstein’s own account 
of recent political history. Even if evaluating practices of hardball may be 
an irreducibly interpretive enterprise,8  certain interpretations of the 
record are bound to be better supported, both by the contextual evidence 
and by the relevant legal and political science literatures. Sober analysis 
in the service of identifying these interpretations is essential to making 
sense of our constitutional life. 
Shugerman’s key methodological move holds considerably more 
promise for the burgeoning effort, which our essay seeks to advance, to 
deepen understanding of constitutional hardball. 9  The concept of 
beanball needs further clarification and development, in our view. But it 
supplies a thought-provoking starting point for refining normative 
                                                                                                                           
 7. See id. at 88. 
 8. Cf. Josh Chafetz & David E. Pozen, How Constitutional Norms Break Down, 65 
UCLA L. Rev. 1430, 1439 (2018) (noting that “all judgments about norm following and 
norm violating are subject to . . . interpretive contestation,” “usually in the absence of an 
authoritative adjudicator”). 
 9. In addition to our own essay and Professor Mark Tushnet’s foundational piece, 
Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 523 (2004), see, for example, 
Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die 106–27 (2018); Greg Sargent, An 
Uncivil War: Taking Back Our Democracy in an Age of Trumpian Disinformation and 
Thunderdome Politics 145–52 (2018); John M. Carey et al., Searching for Bright Lines in the 
Trump Presidency, 17 Persp. on Pol., no. 3, 2019, at 1, http://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/IYWXMF 
[http://perma.cc/EA5J-4WNM]; and Matthew A. Seligman, Constitutional Politics, Court 
Packing, and Judicial Appointments Reform (Cardozo Law Sch., Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 548, 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3210665 (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
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assessments of the government shutdowns, showdowns, and myriad other 
forms of hardball that the nation is likely to face in the near future. 
I. RECIPROCAL YES, SYMMETRICAL NOT SO MUCH 
Bernstein challenges Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball’s descriptive 
thesis in two main ways: by enumerating some examples of alleged 
Democratic constitutional hardball, especially by the Obama Administration, 
that are missing from our analysis10 and by contesting our claim that 
congressional Republicans bear greater responsibility than Democrats for 
government shutdowns and threatened shutdowns during the Clinton 
and Obama Administrations.11 Shugerman’s response exposes a number 
of serious problems with Bernstein’s examples as well as a host of important 
“omissions” in his historical narrative.12 We agree with Shugerman’s 
critiques and will not tax readers’ patience by repeating them here. (We 
have additional disagreements with Bernstein that we discuss briefly in 
section I.B.) Let us focus, instead, on the question that Bernstein poses 
to frame his response: “Who [is] to [b]lame for a ‘[s]hutdown’”13? 
A. Responsibility for Government Shutdowns 
As we write this sentence, on January 23, 2019, the U.S. government 
is in the midst of the longest partial shutdown on record.14 Hundreds of 
thousands of government employees have been furloughed or forced to 
work for extended periods without pay. Untold numbers of other 
Americans have had their lives and livelihoods unsettled. In terms of 
sheer length and magnitude of disruption, this shutdown appears to be 
at least a modest escalation of the shutdown hardball that has occurred in 
recent decades. But who is doing the escalating? Is there any way to tell? 
Bernstein’s central critique of our essay is that assessing responsibil-
ity for acts of constitutional hardball is a hopelessly subjective exercise. 
Comparative analyses such as ours, he asserts, are doomed to “dubious 
empirical validity.”15 To support this assertion, Bernstein focuses on our 
discussion of government shutdowns, which he notes are “one of the . . . 
primary examples” we give of an area in which constitutional hardball 
has been asymmetric.16 We suggest in our essay that House Speaker Newt 
Gingrich and his Republican allies in Congress played harder hardball 
                                                                                                                           
 10. Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 209, 212–17. 
 11. Id. at 210–12. 
 12. Shugerman, supra note 3, at 86. 
 13. Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 210. 
 14. See generally The Longest Shutdown, NBC News, http://www.nbcnews.com/ 
holidayshutdown [http://perma.cc/8P8V-QH8N] (last visited Jan. 24, 2019). 
 15. Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 208. 
 16. Id. at 209. 
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than President Bill Clinton when the government shut down in 1995.17 
Bernstein questions our appraisal of this episode and submits that, in 
important respects, Clinton was the aggressor.18 Similarly, with regard to 
the most recent shutdown, one might ask whether it is fair to lay more of 
the blame at the feet of President Donald Trump rather than House 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi and her Democratic allies in Congress. Every 
government shutdown involves some sort of bargaining breakdown in 
which at least two political factions make choices that fail to result in an 
agreement. There is thus a kind of formal symmetry between the 
bargainers, in that each has failed to accede to the other’s demands. As 
the Associated Press put it in a much-discussed (and quasi-retracted19) 
tweet: “[I]t takes two to tango. Trump’s demand for $5.7 billion for his 
border wall is one reason for the budget impasse. The Democrats[’] 
refusal to approve the money is another.”20 The Associated Press’s tweet 
mirrors Bernstein’s approach.21 
Is this really the best that a fair-minded political observer can do? We 
doubt it. Any number of pieces of evidence might be marshalled in support 
of a more substantive allocative assessment. With regard to the most 
recent shutdown, for instance, the first clue is the President’s own words. 
“I am proud to shut down the government for border security,” Trump 
said in a high-profile televised meeting with Democratic congressional 
leaders.22 “If we don’t get what we want . . . I will shut down the government, 
absolutely. . . . And I’ll tell you what, I am proud to shut down the 
government for border security . . . . So I will take the mantle. I will be 
the [one] to shut it down.”23 While not conclusive evidence, these statements 
                                                                                                                           
 17. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 930, 963. 
 18. See Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 210 (“From a purely 
constitutional perspective, if Congress passes a spending bill that would keep the government 
open and the President vetoes it, then the President—not Congress—has shut down the 
government.”). 
 19. See Erik Wemple, Update: AP Walks Back Tweet That Blamed Both Sides for 
Government Shutdown, Wash. Post (Jan. 9, 2019), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
2019/01/09/associated-press-stands-by-tweet-blaming-both-sides-government-shutdown 
[http://perma.cc/L3KC-WLDY]. 
 20. AP Politics (@AP_Politics), Twitter (Jan. 8, 2019), http://twitter.com/AP_Politics/ 
status/1082857277084893184 [http://perma.cc/6ZTA-EQ9R]. 
 21. Compare id., with Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 210 (“[I]f 
the President and Congress are unable to reach a compromise that would lead the 
President to sign a spending bill passed by Congress, both the President and Congress 
played constitutional hardball to shut down the government.”). 
 22. Aaron Blake, Trump’s Extraordinary Oval Office Squabble with Chuck Schumer 
and Nancy Pelosi, Annotated, Wash. Post (Dec. 11, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/2018/12/11/trumps-extraordinary-oval-office-squabble-with-chuck-schumer-nancy- 
pelosi-annotated [http://perma.cc/QSP9-78QF]. 
 23. Id. Bernstein acknowledges that in the 1995 episode “some congressional 
Republicans, including Speaker Gingrich, made public statements essentially welcoming a 
shutdown.” Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 212. 
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strongly support the proposition that the President intended to cause a 
shutdown, that he was “proud” to play this form of constitutional hardball 
in order to “get what we want.” 
President Trump’s claim of responsibility is also supported by undis-
puted facts. A government shutdown might arise because each side seeks 
reforms to the budget or the budgetmaking process that the other side 
refuses to accept. This was not that sort of shutdown. In this case, one 
side (here, the Democrats) repeatedly passed “clean” continuing resolu-
tions to reopen the government, with no demands for changes to the 
baseline of budgets hammered out in prior rounds of negotiation, while 
the other side (here, the President supported by Senate Republicans) 
pressed for a significant change to that baseline (specifically, $5.7 billion 
in funding for “the wall”) and insisted that it would not allow the govern-
ment to be reopened until this singular demand was met.24 Only one side 
was using the shutdown as a means to push through a high-priority 
political objective. For reasons we discuss in Asymmetric Constitutional 
Hardball, it is not altogether surprising that a party ideologically committed 
to attacking the federal government on a variety of fronts might find 
federal government shutdowns an appealing form of policy leverage.25 
Seeing this requires the sort of context-sensitive, political-sociological 
analysis that Bernstein wishes to discredit. 
Historical events are susceptible to multiple interpretations, both 
immediately and over time. But some interpretations may nevertheless be 
superior to others. 26  Bernstein’s retrospective reimagining of the 
Clinton–Gingrich confrontation inadvertently illustrates this point quite 
                                                                                                                           
 24. See, e.g., Juliegrace Brufke, House Votes on 10th Bill to Reopen Government, 
Hill (Jan. 23, 2019), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/426666-house-passes-eighth-bill-
to-reopen-government [http://perma.cc/K52M-7HJD] (discussing “the 10th clean-funding 
measure that Democrats have voted on to end the partial government shutdown, with 
most of them passing in the chamber”); Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, Senate Set to 
Reject Government Funding Plan It Once Embraced, Politico (Jan. 23, 2019), http://www. 
politico.com/story/2019/01/23/senate-government-funding-votes-fail-1121640 [http:// 
perma.cc/F2YY-GCLW] (recounting some of this history and reporting that, according to an 
anonymous Republican Senator, “GOP leaders are trying to crush the [latest] ‘continuing 
resolution’ to force Democrats to negotiate on Trump’s border wall”). The “clean” continuing 
resolutions play a useful role here as an objective indicator of which side was insisting on 
changes to the status quo. By themselves, these resolutions are not dispositive evidence of 
their opponents’ playing harder hardball. But they are strong evidence, particularly in the 
absence of some exigency so recent that it could not have been dealt with in the last budget 
agreement and so significant that it calls into question the relevance of the previously 
agreed-upon budget baseline. 
 25. See Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 961–65. 
 26. Cf. Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
Colum. L. Rev. 523, 551 (1995) (noting that while historians do not necessarily “determine 
what is historically true,” “they commonly resolve what is historically convincing”); Thomas 
L. Haskell, Objectivity Is Not Neutrality: Rhetoric vs. Practice in Peter Novick’s That Noble 
Dream, 29 Hist. & Theory 129, 134 (1990) (defending a “conception of objectivity,” implicitly 
shared by most historians, that is “compatible with strong political commitment”). 
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well. Because Shugerman refutes Bernstein’s account of this confronta-
tion at some length,27 we will not belabor it here. But the view that 
Clinton broke more rules of normal constitutional politics than Gingrich 
during the 1995 shutdown is simply a poor interpretation of what 
happened. The preexisting patterns of legislative–executive budgetary 
negotiations, the parties’ rhetoric about their actions, the parties’ goals 
and intentions (to the extent they can be discerned), and the contem-
poraneous responses of knowledgeable observers can each inform a 
judgment about the extent to which either side is playing constitutional 
hardball.28 In the shutdowns of the mid-1990s, these factors all point 
toward Gingrich as the disrupter of the constitutional status quo and the 
harder hardball player.29 
Accordingly, Bernstein’s suggestion that Clinton was equally or even 
more responsible than Gingrich for shutting down the government does 
not demonstrate what Bernstein implies it demonstrates: that assessing 
the partisan distribution of constitutional hardball is a fool’s errand. On 
the contrary, Bernstein’s own chief example demonstrates that such 
assessments can be made with reasonable empirical validity and without 
compromising norms of scholarly objectivity. There is a broad consensus 
that Gingrich was the principal constitutional norm-breaker in this instance, 
a consensus buttressed by multiple overlapping forms of evidence. 
And so, rather than flip one of our main examples on its head, 
Bernstein’s discussion of government shutdowns devolves into a recapit-
ulation of points we ourselves emphasize in Asymmetric Constitutional 
Hardball: that “constitutional hardball is by nature reciprocal” and that 
“both Democratic and Republican officeholders engage in it to some 
substantial extent.”30 No one disputes this. It is a fallacy, however, to conflate 
this observation about hardball reciprocity with a conclusion of hardball 
symmetry.31 As we stress in our essay, “even if constitutional hardball is by 
                                                                                                                           
 27. Shugerman, supra note 3, at 94–96. 
 28. Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball canvasses dozens of historical examples, without 
dwelling at length on any, and it examines possible drivers of hardball asymmetry at a 
wholesale rather than a retail level. But for any given constitutional confrontation, these 
same sorts of factors can be analyzed to help get purchase on which side, if any, is playing 
hardball and to what degree. 
 29. In addition to Shugerman’s valuable discussion of this episode, see Fishkin & 
Pozen, supra note 1, at 961–65, 963 n.189 (quoting Gingrich and other Republican leaders 
as expressing excitement about closing the government and explaining why contemporary 
Republicans are more predisposed than Democrats to support shutdowns); and Peter M. 
Shane, When Inter-Branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, “Orderly Shutdowns,” 
Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial “Coups,” 12 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 503, 516–
21 (2003) (describing ways in which Gingrich’s behavior during the 1995 shutdown 
“dramatically . . . departed from conventional inter-branch practice” as well as public 
sentiment). 
 30. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 927. 
 31. When President Trump declared after the lethal violence at the August 2017 
Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, that “there is blame on both sides,” Full Text: 
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nature reciprocal, it nonetheless remains possible that one side may play 
hardball more frequently or intensively than the other side over a 
sustained period of time.”32 Nothing in Bernstein’s response addresses 
this possibility, much less refutes it. 
B. Additional Errors and an Instructive Example 
Bernstein’s other efforts to refute the asymmetry thesis miss the 
mark in more obvious respects. Bernstein contends, for instance, that our 
“focus on the twenty-five-year period beginning in 1993 . . . does not 
excuse ignoring the Reagan and Bush shutdowns.”33 On its face, this 
contention seems odd: To focus on a certain historical period is, by 
definition, to pay less attention to other periods. The gravamen of 
Bernstein’s charge must therefore be that our real claim (assumed or 
implied) is that constitutional hardball has been asymmetric for much 
longer than twenty-five years, but that we have cherry-picked the post-
1993 period in order to elide inconvenient counterexamples. 
This reflects a fundamental misreading of our essay. Asymmetric 
Constitutional Hardball explicitly notes that “[a] historical study with a 
longer time horizon might reveal that asymmetric constitutional hardball 
has an epicyclical character in the American system, with the party that 
feels it was on the losing end of prior periods of hardball becoming the 
dominant hardball player in subsequent periods.”34 The asymmetry that 
the essay describes and diagnoses is a story about the past quarter century 
                                                                                                                           
Trump’s Comments on White Supremacists, ‘Alt-Left’ in Charlottesville, Politico (Aug. 15, 
2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/15/full-text-trump-comments-white-
supremacists-alt-left-transcript-241662 [http://perma.cc/K4YQ-A33C], he was widely ridiculed 
for committing a related fallacy. It is true that it takes two “sides” (or more) to have any conflict. 
But it is a logical error to infer from this that the sides bear equal moral responsibility for the 
conflict, just as it is a logical error to assume that they must be fighting in a similar manner. 
 32. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 927. We go on to detail many reasons, 
grounded in the legal and political science literatures, to suspect that this possibility has 
been realized in recent U.S. experience. Id. at 938–76. Bernstein does not attempt to 
dispute any of these reasons, which constitute the core of our argument. 
 33. Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 212. 
 34. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 933–34; see also id. at 942 n.110 (“As we have 
suggested, built-in counterdynamics may tend to complicate or reverse the directionality 
of asymmetric constitutional hardball over long political cycles.”). 
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or so, since the Gingrich Revolution.35 We chose this period deliberately 
and defended the choice. Earlier periods may be different.36 
Bernstein’s response also focuses almost exclusively on Obama-era 
executive actions rather than on congressional machinations, notwith-
standing our essay’s argument that the clearest asymmetries can be found 
in legislative contexts.37 He provides only one example of legislative 
hardball that our essay failed to consider. In support of the claim that 
“congressional Democrats . . . did sometimes play constitutional hardball 
during the Obama years,”38 he calls attention to Senate Democrats’ 
(largely symbolic) vote in 2014 in favor of a constitutional amendment to 
overturn Citizens United v. FEC.39 
This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of constitutional 
hardball. Absent very unusual circumstances, proposing a formal amend-
ment to the Constitution does not “break the perceived rules of normal 
constitutional politics,” as all acts of hardball definitionally do.40 It is the 
epitome of playing by the rules. 
The bulk of Bernstein’s examples take the form of recharacterizing 
Obama Administration initiatives in ways that make them seem more 
norm-shattering, more ruthless, or otherwise more nefarious than our 
essay suggested. Bernstein is the legal academy’s most unrelenting critic of 
the Obama Administration. If one believes, as he does, that this 
Administration was uniquely craven and “lawless”41—a view that is 
                                                                                                                           
 35. “The way he saw it,” recalls a recent chronicle of Gingrich’s rise to power, 
“Republicans would never be able to take back the House as long as they kept compromising 
with the Democrats out of some high-minded civic desire to keep congressional business 
humming along.” McKay Coppins, The Man Who Broke Politics, Atlantic (Nov. 2018), http:// 
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/newt-gingrich-says-youre-welcome/570832 
[http://perma.cc/DP4D-UTK5] (last updated Oct. 17, 2018). Gingrich’s “strategy was to blow 
up the bipartisan coalitions that were essential to legislating, and then seize on the resulting 
dysfunction to wage a populist crusade against the institution of Congress itself.” Id. 
 36. Although we acknowledge Shugerman’s careful dissection of what occurred during 
the shutdowns of the Reagan and Bush years, we do not take the position (and here we may 
differ with Shugerman) that the present pattern of asymmetric constitutional hardball 
necessarily predates Gingrich’s speakership. The constitutional-governance dynamics of 
those years were distinct, in no small part because of a less polarized Congress. 
 37. See, e.g., Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 920 (“[T]he most straightforward cases 
of hardball often occur in legislatures. Legislative bodies teem with rules and norms, not 
expressly required by constitution or statute, that govern the interactions among political 
blocs within the institution.”); id. at 937 n.95 (“[W]e observe greater asymmetry [in 
Congress].”). 
 38. Bernstein, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 2, at 217. 
 39. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 40. Fishkin & Pozen, supra note 1, at 925. More formally, we define constitutional 
hardball as political maneuvers that “violate[] or strain[] constitutional conventions for 
partisan ends” or “attempt[] to shift settled understandings of the Constitution in an unusually 
aggressive or self-entrenching manner.” Id. at 921–23 (emphasis omitted). 
 41. See generally David E. Bernstein, Lawless: The Obama Administration’s 
Unprecedented Assault on the Constitution and the Rule of Law (2015). 
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commonplace in right-wing media but that has little correspondence 
with reality as most everyone outside that epistemic community sees it—
then reading many of President Obama’s behaviors as outrageous instances 
of constitutional hardball may make some sense. Absent that belief, 
Bernstein’s catalog of “unilateralist tactics”42 looks far less compelling. 
Like all of his recent predecessors, President Obama engaged in some 
forms of executive action that pressed various envelopes. Unlike his pre-
decessors, Obama generally did so in response to “unyielding opposition” by 
congresspersons from the other party to his policies and to the legitimacy 
of his presidency.43 Bernstein’s portrait of rampant lawlessness under 
President Obama’s watch is not simply uncharitable; it carries overtones 
of the “paranoid” political worldview identified by Richard Hofstadter44 
and foregrounded by Shugerman.45 
Consider for a moment the central charge in Bernstein’s bill of 
particulars. His depiction of the Obama Administration’s efforts to reach 
a nuclear nonproliferation deal with Iran as “a particularly important 
example of Democratic constitutional hardball”46 not only rests on a 
hyperbolic account of the deal’s development (and one that entirely 
ignores the extreme tactics of its opponents) but also glosses over the 
critical detail that the Administration framed the deal as a legally 
nonbinding “political commitment.” 47  As Professor Marty Lederman 
explained at the time, “Presidents and their diplomatic agents have been 
entering into such nonbinding political agreements on behalf of the U.S. 
for over a century,” in all cases without congressional approval, to the 
point that such agreements are now “ubiquitous.”48 As Professor Jack 
Goldsmith has highlighted, the nonbinding formulation also made the 
deal relatively easy to undo, “pav[ing] the way for President Trump to 
withdraw from it” unilaterally.49 Constitutional hardball by the Obama 
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Administration? Debatably. Hardball so “vigorous”50 as to upend the 
whole asymmetry thesis? Hardly. 
At almost the exact same time that Bernstein’s response was published 
(on December 7, 2018), before the most recent federal government shut-
down, American politics supplied an instructive example of asymmetric 
constitutional hardball at the state level. Following a template used in 2016 
by their North Carolina counterparts, outgoing Republican legislators in 
Michigan and Wisconsin passed bills to strip authority from their states’ 
newly elected Democratic governors.51 Meanwhile, Democrats in New 
Jersey proposed a reform to their state’s legislative redistricting process 
that many observers, though not all,52 characterized as a ploy to “writ[e] 
gerrymandering into the State Constitution.”53 Yet the New Jersey Democrats 
quickly backed down after being blasted by leading Democratic Party 
figures,54 liberal media outlets,55 and liberal advocacy groups56 for an 
attempted “partisan power grab[].”57 Leaders in the Republican national 
network did not likewise revolt, or say much of anything, against the 
Michigan, North Carolina, or Wisconsin measures.58 
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Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball emphasizes that hardball practices 
are shaped by a broad set of actors within each party’s coalition.59 As 
these state-level developments reflect, over the past several decades there 
have been more significant actors within the Democratic coalition who 
are apt to discourage rather than encourage various forms of constitu-
tional hardball. Virtually any group of politicians in a two-party system 
will be tempted to play constitutional hardball at least semiregularly, and 
sometimes will go ahead and do it. Again, no one disputes this. But 
again, it does not follow that every group therefore approaches constitu-
tional hardball with the same incentives and constraints or employs it 
with the same success. 
II. “BEANBALL” AND THE NORMATIVE EVALUATION OF HARDBALL 
If the fallacy of conflating reciprocity with symmetry threatens to get 
in the way of clear-eyed empirical assessments of constitutional hardball, 
a different fallacy threatens to get in the way of clear-eyed normative 
assessments. Simply put, it is a mistake to assume that constitutional 
hardball is inevitably or irredeemably bad.60 As we argue in Asymmetric 
Constitutional Hardball, “[w]hile all acts of constitutional hardball create 
systemic risks, . . . specific acts may be justified for a variety of contextual 
normative reasons; sound political judgment might even require that 
certain types of hardball be played in certain situations.”61 
Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball does not develop this analysis 
much further.62 Clearly there is a great deal of work to be done, on both 
sides of the equation. On one side: Which kinds of contextual reasons 
may make constitutional hardball more defensible on democratic, legal, 
or other grounds? On the opposite side, equally important: Which kinds 
of constitutional hardball are more damaging than others, such that the 
reasons needed to justify them must be stronger—perhaps, in some cases, 
so strong that these forms of hardball will almost never be justified? 
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Shugerman’s distinction between hardball and beanball seeks to 
advance analysis of the second question. He argues that certain forms of 
norm-breaching behaviors, the ones he calls beanball, are different in 
kind from the rest in that they are “fundamentally antidemocratic”63: 
They aim to undermine political opponents’ ability to participate in the 
democratic process. Voter suppression is Shugerman’s paradigm case of 
beanball, but he maintains that a variety of other tactics, from extreme 
gerrymandering to racialized appeals to white constituents to the politi-
cization of the Department of Justice, should also qualify.64 
We are skeptical that the hardball/beanball distinction can be 
demarcated with a bright line. While Shugerman seems to suggest that 
hardball and beanball are distinct phenomena,65 it seems to us that beanball 
is better understood as a subset of hardball. Shugerman’s framework also 
raises complex and interesting issues about what qualifies as “fundamentally 
antidemocratic”—a test that implicates large questions of democratic 
theory and would be central to drawing any workable boundary around 
the category of examples that Shugerman groups as beanball. 
That said, we think Shugerman’s core point is powerful and correct. 
In constitutional politics, there are many different norms that members 
of either party might breach, and many different means for those in 
power to entrench their preferred view of the Constitution. But not all of 
these potential hardball maneuvers impose the same costs on the consti-
tutional system. Consider two examples near the extreme ends of the 
spectrum. Suppose, first, that a majority party unilaterally abandons or 
dilutes the “blue-slip” custom through which home-state Senators have 
historically been allowed to block certain judges. Senate Republicans did 
just this in the most recent Congress,66 and it clearly counts as consti-
tutional hardball—one more foray in the long-running judicial confirmation 
wars. Like all constitutional hardball, such a move might be viewed as 
unfair, and it has the potential to undermine institutional values ranging 
from trust to civility to comity to cooperation. The democratic value of 
the blue-slip custom itself, however, was always rather dubious;67 in the 
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abstract, many partisans on both sides of the aisle might agree that the 
judicial confirmation process is better off without it. 
Now consider an effort to purge the voter rolls. Suppose that 
election officials from one political party employ an imprecise scheme of 
name-and-birthday matching in order to achieve the predictable conse-
quence of un-registering many voters who were lawfully registered, in a 
manner that will redound on net to the benefit of the election officials’ 
party. Suppose as well that because of the makeup of the relevant courts, 
this initiative can proceed without a high risk of meaningful judicial 
pushback. In broad strokes, state Republican officials have been accused 
of spearheading such efforts in recent years.68 This second example is 
also a form of constitutional hardball. But it differs along a number of 
salient axes from the first example, the most obvious of which is that to 
the extent that it works, it does so by (differentially) disenfranchising 
some of the other party’s voters. 
Shugerman wants us to stop calling the second example hardball 
and start calling it beanball. On his account, this sort of example is not 
simply norm-breaking; it is democracy-breaking. We agree. Anyone trying 
to defend such behaviors faces a very high, and perhaps insurmountable, 
burden of justification. Whether or not we need an entirely separate 
label for this category, we have compelling reasons to repudiate constitu-
tional hardball that operates by disenfranchising political opponents. 
(Conversely, constitutional hardball that operates by improving the 
system of democratic representation, such as by enfranchising people 
who ought to be enfranchised but have not been, may be especially 
defensible.69) Even if certain other forms of hardball are equally effective 
at entrenching incumbents, the democratic harm of outright disenfran-
chisement is arguably unique. 
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CONCLUSION 
The project of Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball is, as the essay states, 
“primarily descriptive and explanatory”70: not to condemn constitutional 
hardball but to try to understand it better. Identifying any given behavior 
as constitutional hardball is only the beginning of analysis. The careful 
study of the phenomenon depends on an appreciation of this point. 
Shugerman suggests that “fundamentally antidemocratic” modes of 
constitutional hardball should be judged especially harshly.71 Fundamen-
tally prodemocratic modes, in contrast, merit an opposite response. But 
what counts as fundamentally antidemocratic or prodemocratic, and 
what should we make of all the cases that lie in between? To date, there 
has not been much work on the question of when and why certain types 
of constitutional hardball may be justified as a matter of political morality. 
Nor has there been much work on the important question Shugerman 
raises of when and why certain types of constitutional hardball must be 
seen as beyond the pale. Developing criteria to guide both sets of 
judgments is a vital task for scholars and reformers alike. 
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